Absrmcr-I n this paper we introduce and develop a framework for the data-hiding technologies that aim at resolving emerging problem8 of modern publie networks. First, we emphasize the main open insue. in public network security, quality of senrieei control a n d secure communications. Secondly, we formulate digital data hiding a i communications with side information and advocate an appropriate information-theoretic framework for the analysis of different data hiding methods in various applications. I n particular, Gel'fand-Piniker channel idding with side information at the eneader and Wyner-Ziv ~o u r c e coding with aide information at the decoder are uied for thin purpose. Finally, we demonatrate the possible extenlions of thin theory for watermark-amsilted multimedia processing and indicate its perspective. for diitributed networka.
I. INTRODUCTiON
The mass diffusion of digital media and the explosiw growth of telecommunication are reshaping the lifestyles of ordinary people, research and industry. Over the last decade, the rise of digital telecommunication technologies (including ATM, PSTN, ISDN, ADSL, IP networks) has fundamentally altered how people work, think, communicate, and sooialize. New emerging audiokisual applications have recently appeared thanks to the public multimedia networks. This growth is especially obserEd in networked video applications such as video phones, video conferencing, video email, video streaming, digital TV, high-definition TV (HDTV) , video on demand (VoD), distance learning, remote collaboration and surveillance.
However, despite the obvious progess of public networks, these dewlopments carry with them a number of risks such as copyright violation, prohibited usage and disaibution of digital media, seCret communications, and network security Therefore, security, scalability and manageability amongst others become issues of serious concern, as current solutions do not satisfy anymore the growing demands of multimedia communications,
In the scope of this paper, we will focus on a possible solution for public network security in order to prevent "ihe authors are win mi-University of Genevq Stochanic Image Procenmg Group, 24 rue Generd-Dufour, 1211 Genevs Swikeriand. The contact author is S. Volosh~ovskly (email: svola@wi.unige.ch), http:ilsip.unige.ch unauthorized data exchange and to ensure secure communications.
The paper has two main objectives. The first objective is to introduce and to overview a novel approach to multimedia security in public networks that is based on data-hiding technologies. We will consider fundamentals of digital &ta hiding technologies in comparison with tlr: traditional means of multimedia security A basic theoretical model of a data hiding system will be analyzed, and we will demonstrate the relevance of datahiding problems to digital communications. We will show the advantages of data-hiding based multimedia security protocols over the traditional general means of security based on encryption, scrambling and Fuewall systems.
The second objective of the paper is to demonstrate some of the main achievements in the field of digital data-hiding technologies for multimedia network security and quality-ofservice control. We will present the state-of-the-art solutions for copyright protection of digital media, integrity verification, detection of modifications of the multimedia. content, and secure communications.
The paper is organizedas follows: Section II outlines the main open issues in public networks. Sections III and lV introduce an alternative approach to public network security and secure communications based on digital data hiding and~present the main problems to be addressed. Section V is dedicated to robust watermarking. Section VI considers integrity control and tamper proofing as well as watermarkassisted communications, and Section VII presents secure the effect of delay and jitter (timingerrors). Latency can also be an issue when two-way communication is necessary.
Finite bandwidth (network sharing, limited resources). Bandwidth is the amount of data that can traverse the network or a part of the network at any given time. Network bandwidth is a shared, limited resomce and will vary with time. A network may not be able to guarantee-that the required bandwidth for Uansporting multimedia data will be available.
In addition heterogeneity and time-variance are impottant factors for public network multimedia communications. A heterogeneous network is a network whose parts (subnetworks) may have vastly unequal resources. For example, some parts of a heterogeneous network may have abundant bandwidthand excellent congestioncontrol while other parts of the network are owrloaded and congested by overuse or by a lack of physical network resources. D&ferent receixrs on a heterogeneous network can experience different performance characteristics. When streanling video over a heterogeneous network, the video stream should be decodable ar optimal quality for users with a good network connection, andat usable quality for users with a poor connection. Tunevariance implies thatbandwidth, delay, loss, or other network characteristics can sigificantly vary owr time, sometimes drastically changing in a matter of seconds. Tla: Internet is a difficult network for transpotting real-time multimedia data, and is an example of a heterogeneous, tune-varying, network with no QoS control.
B. Network s e c w i b
Network security is n o less important a problem of public networks. Due to the open nature of data communication protocols in public networks, special care about access con-UoI, authentication, secure deliwry and intmsion detection should be taken. Traditional means of network security such as Firewalls, virtual private networks (VPN) and intrusion detection systems (IDS) are well suited for specialized applications where the above questions can be under control in the range of some closed trusted environment. However, thew solutions are not appropriate for highly disuibuted pqblic environments. Moreover, the definition of traffic disregarO. the name of the multimedia content, interpreting any kind of multimedia as purely digital flow. This has a huge impact on many aspects of network security since modern secret communication tools based on steganalysis, viruses based on content embedding and content management systems are designed using completely different interpretation of the multimedia content Moreover, contrarily to the traditional approaches, new public distributed networks cannot anymore rely on file headers, reliable meta data or centralized bodies. Recent examples of distributed networks based on P2P communications practically demonstrate how easily huge amount of information can be exchange in completely uncontrolled manner leading to secret communications, copyright violation and illegal or prohibited content distribution [Z] . Traditional network security can hardly cope with the= requirements, Internet as a public network is a very challenging environment for secure and reliable transport of real-time multimedia data. Interrrt is a heterogeneous and time-varying network, has no QoS control and no efficient and reliahle mechanisms for copyright protection, access control and secure communications. Therefore, we will below consider potential approaches that make at least partially possible to satisfy (or to complement existing solutions to) the above emerging problems.
MULTIMEDIA SECURITY: MAIN OPEN ISSUES
Multimedia content security has a number of specific requirements that should allow to answer to the following questions:
Who has issued the multimedia content? Who is the content owner? When was the content issued? Who has access right to the content? Is the content modified? e Where was the content modified?
What was the original content before modification? It is obvious that specializd protocols or hardware alone are not able to resolve all these questions. At the same time, new emerging requirements to secure Internet communications essentially extended t k horizons of traditional cryptography protocols. A new paradigm has to answer not only the question ofhow to communicate in a secure way but also how to communicate in a completely undetectable way over public networks. This subsequently leads to the extension of the concept of cowrt communications and requires the creation of new "covert" multimedia channels. Finally, the related open problem of quality-of-service control requires to provide the answer on the question how to communicate in a robust way providing end-to-end services?
The list of these diverse problems seems to be very broad and from a traditional point of view there does not seem to exist any common means of satisfying all these requirements. However, there are some common aspects of secure and reliable communications that could be addressed by novel technologies based on digital data hiding.
IV. MULTIMEDIA DATA-HIDING
Multimedia data-hiding represents an alternative concept for public network security and secure communications and can be considered as an assisting functionality. Multimedia data-hiding provides an additional ''virtual" or covert channel of digital communications through the embedding of some secret unperceived information directly into the multimediacontent without extra meta data, hpaders, sophisticated specialized formats and attachments. This naturally leads to the concept of a .vnur/ rrutlitr where the featues of the multimedia content are extended to extra fmctionalities that can be exploited for multimedia processing, communications, security and content management.
The concept of a smart media can be generally characterized as:
self-sufficient or self-embedding (no extra headers, meta data and attachments are needed); self-synchronizing (no synchronization information is used on the protocol side); self-mthenticating (no access to the original data is required to establish the content authmticity);
. self-correcting and offering error concealment (no format protocol modifications related to fonvardhackwarderrw corrections are necessary).
Besides t k obvious advantages listed above, multimedia data hiding should additionally provide: perceptually invisible data embedding; robust and content independent extraction of embedded information; scalability of the content for different heterogeneous networks and applications; security provided by a proper key management and undetectability of the hidden data presene by the existing detection tools.
We consider multimedia datahiding with respect to three main applications h t should address the open issues presented in Section In:
. robust watermarking;
integrity control and tamper proofing; secure communications. The robust watermarking is mainly used for copyright protection, content authentication and content hacking. Integrity control and tamper proofing target verification of content integity, detection of local modifications in images, video and documents, recovering of the original content based on available copy of the modified or taniperedcontent. Flnally secure communications address the issue of secure content deliwry over the public networks using two different possibilities. The first possibility is a visual "enciyption" or scrambling that should provide additional error resilience in the case of wireless networks and networks with packet losses and erasures. The second possibility is stegmography that guarantees secure content deliwry by hiding the content to be securely communicated into the covert media whereas the presence of the hidden content presence should not be detected by various detection tools.
v. ROBUST WATERMARKING
Robust watermarking is one of the most challenging research directions of data-hiding combining a number of multidisciplinary issues ranging from infoimation theovand digital communications, estimation and detection theory: to image processing and computer vision. Robust watermarking, from the information-theoretic perspective, should provide the reliable communication of some energy constrained payload v c in the body of a multimedia content under a broad list of various intentional and unintentional attacks, those attacks constituting the resulting watermaking channel. The protocol describing robust watermarking can be schematically explained as in Figure 1 . This prOtOCGl consists of three main parts, i.e., information embedding or encoder, channel that represents the public network and information extraction part or decoder.
The goal of the information embedder consists iii the invisible "integration" of a specifically preprocessed payload ??& into the original (host) content x based on some secret key h~. We assume that the message 31, uniformly distributed over the message set .M with the cardinality 1.L41, is encoded based on a secret key into some watermark tpically has a length of 64 bits, i.e., ].MI = ?'.'I, and is content independent. In some cases, only a binary decision about the watermark presemelabsence can be required: I.WI = 2 (socalled I-bit watermarking, i.e., log2 I.MI = 1 bit). As another example, the printing industry only requires 16 bits for document tracking aiming at identifying the distribution channels. In any case, the payload for robust waterniakkmg is relatidy modest and rarely exceeds 100 bits. The embedding rule can be expressed as a mapping: 
?/'[i] = X[L] -' l l ' [ l ] : 0 )
where 7~1 is a particular realization of the random message (so-called non-causal side information). We also include in this generalized model both spread spectrum schemes and host interference cancellation schemes based on pre- 
where The channel is characterized as a transition probability p(!/lw: x:I. The channel can be quite general and include both signal processing and geometrical distortions of the stego data. In the particukr case of intentional attacks, the attacker aims at removing the watermark w from y' producing the attacked data y. The admissible attacker distortion is D:! that is defined in the same way as (3) between vectors y' and y:
One should also note another possibility to define the attacker distortion between the original data x and the attacked data y . The decoder produces tlr: estimate of :rI based o n y using:
15)
where y(.j denotes the decoding rule and y = y -= {~/[l]:!/~~]l.....!,[;'i]} is the fistorred stego data. The decoding emor occurs when . \ I # .\I. A particular case of generalized decoding rule ,I/(.:] is the maximum a posteriory (MAP) decoding rule, which minimizes the probability of error: 771 = f k 7~! / 7 l K t J~, ,~~~~,~( T j l~~/ " ' 1 .
( 6 )
The cryptographic security of a robust watermarking system is considered as the s)stein "immunity" apinst message removal or estimation using knowledge of the algorithms (2) and (5) . T k blind cryptographic attack, that can be applied without tk hiowledge of the secret key I<, can be simply designed as an exhaustive search procedure over all possible values of the watennark w. The nuniber of all possible watermarks to be tested in such a way is determined by the entropy of the watermark. It is obvious, that under the constraint C[w2] < 0, the tnaxinium entropy of a wateimark with Gaussian p.d.f. is h(1l.) = ~~O~~Q T C D ! ;~.
In many practical watermarking algorithms-such as quantization index modulation (QIM) [ 5 ] , scalar Costa scheme (SCS) [6] or distortion compensated VIM (DC-VIM), the watermark code book is structured by some binning strategies that aims at host interference cancellation (or watermark invariance to the values of host images) and invariance to the geometrical transforms. This leads to scalar or vector quantization encoding strategies that represent the regular lattices aiming at ouxcoming the shaping loss (to be as close as possible to Gaussian p.d.f), and periodical watermark spatial tiling to resist against a€he and projectiw transforms. This leads to the reduction of randomness or ambiguity at the watemiark decoding. Obviously, code book stlucturinz is k n o r m as a part of the algorithm for the attacker. Howexrer, it also reduces the enhopy of the watemiark as any conditioning h(1l-) 1 h(ll-l.SC] where ,SC is a structure of the code book and gives more infonnation leakage for the attacker. Therefore, some special care should be taken to prevent this leakage and to apply the data-hiding in such a way t h t this leakage will not be crucial for a given application. The first attempt to formalize the security of the robust watemiarking technoloaes has been done by Bami Shannon's theory states that if x is known at both ends, then the channel capacity is equal to its theoretical upper bound [E]: m. h ., If x is not known at both a d s , then it acts as a strong interference. In the case of watermarking, the host data x is available at the encoder. Therefore, this scheme can be considered as communication with side information available at the encoder. In this case, the problem of data hiding can be reformulated as a reliable communication of the message I I L over the channel with noise z and interference
x being known at the encoder but not at the decoder. The most general formulation of such type of communications was considered by Gel'fand and Pinsker in 1980 in nonwatermarking applications and the capacity of this scheme was found as [3] :
where C ' is an auxiliary random variable. The Gel'fand-Pinker problem has a quite simple intuitive interpretation using a random binning argument. If we denote a set of all elements (codewords) as 2'-'"'q-E and apply a random binniig technique we assume that each bin (subset) associated to a particuhr message has P~~c~'~-~~-~ ekments. It is tlm easy to find the total number of uniquely distinguished . I and C = +lo& (1 i-9) and where B.le auxiliary random miable llas a form of Lr = li' + c r S and CI = 6 is chosen to provide independence of 1.V -~(11. i Z) and i . 1; +-Z. Having considered the theoretical foundations of host interference cancellation using side information at the encoder, we concentrate on the practical data-hiding schemes. We will assume a binary representation of TIL E b of length Lb, i.e., b E {O,l}L*. b is encoded into a sequence of letters d of Fig, 2. mation at the tncoder.
Robust waicrmarking as communications with side infor- However, contrarily to digital communications where the sequence d is directly used for the transmission owr the noisy channel, the encoded message is combined with tlle host data in digital data-hidiiig applications according to the additive model (2) . In a more general setup, the resulting watermark w could be: Depending on the different embedding rules (I), we can classify all existing data-hiding techniques as those that do not use the side information about the had data at the encoder, and those thak use the side information. The LSBM encoder embeds the data according to the next rule:
that are shifted by A wid) respect to each other:
( 1 6 ) where Q,J(,.) denotes the corresponding quantizer for ci = -1 and d = +1. The QlM embeddig distortion is:
(1:j Therefore, the embedding distortion for the LSBM is higher than that for the Q M However, it is messary to note that t k LSBM can have the same embedding distortion as the QlM, if one applies a distoltion minimization procedure choosing the resulting quantization bin with the minimum possible distortion after final addition of the M-PAM watermark. Thi will not affect the capacity, but it will decrease the embedding distoltion. The QIM decoder performs the MLestimation: binary QIhA-baaad embedding.
Frobability of cmor coinputation for ])(!)Id = +I) and
?he performance of different watermark encoding and modulation (embedding) techniques can be considered &';
pending on an operatiomi WNR WNR = IOlog,io3 for AWGN chvtnels. Low-rate data hiding achieves A W d channel capacity in low-WNR regime while high-rate data hiding is posnile for relatively high-WNRregime. The low-WNR regene is typical for robust digital watermarkingwhen the attack is aiming ai removing the watermark In this case, the variance of the attack might be hi&r thm the variance of the watermark. In this case, the host interference is not C N C~ for approaching channel capacity and spread spatrun based datahiding can be sufficient. In this regime, two approaches to watermark encoding are mostly used in practice: binary watermark encoding using b i w low-rate error correcting codes with soft decoding (Turbo codes, or LDPC codes); *binmy watermarkencodingusingtheabovebinmy codes with higher rates and following replication.
The first approach is characterized by a lower probability of error while the second one has a hi&er resistance against the cropping attack. It should be also noticed that the error correction codes for erasure channels can also be used to withstand cropping attack. Additionally, properly desigred reptitiw watermark can be also used to recover from geometrical attacks that are characterized by an affine transform, using self-synchronization [201, [211, [131 Recently, the same franiework was applied to edge-process stochastic image models proposed by Voloshynovskiy d (11 [26] where not so optiinistic results were reported concemhg the a c h d &ta hiding capacity for robust watermarking Most of robust wateroiarkiiig schemes are wblerable to the copy attack [27], a protocol attack which consists in the estimation of the watemiark froin a protected image and its re-embedding into another medii, creating an ambiguity about the hold copyright.
It should also be mentioned that additional specific requirements of robust data hiding for medical and military applications exist, where the robust watemiark should be reversible (i.e., completely removable with the corresponding authorization). This preserves the quality of the content and allows personalizing the content for different users.
The first practical schemes of ieversible watermarking were proposedby Fridrich cl. 01 PSI, [B] It is also required to have high robustness to all intentional and unintentional attacks and distortions both coming from signal processing and geometrical transformations. The security requirement calls for a p r o p resistance against message removal that would be based on the knowledge of the algorithm.
The design of practical algorithms that take into account all these conflicting requirements is a very challenging t a s k One of the possible examples of a practical technique based on the SS-based embedding with softdecoding that meets these requirements is the Berkut 1.0 technology developed at the University of Geneva [32]. Berkuf 1.0 has the best so far reported benchmarking scores according to Stirmark 3.1 (0.996). The watermark embedding is performed in a critically sampled wavelet domain with appropriate anisotropic perceptid mask that takes into account texture and luminance masking in each sub band. The robustness against geometrical attacks is ensured based on a special periodical watermark An important issue of watermark security of periodical watermark is also resolved by increasing the watermark entropy and thus reducing the watermark predictability. The watermark is not simply repeated like it is done in the majority of SS-based techniques but it is tiled with some key-dependent predistoltions in such a way that a non-authorizedaveraging of all tiles leads to the . watermark self-destruction and thus watermark prediction is not very accurate. However, we should note that although this technology is practically very robust to all attacks from the S t h a r k benchmark, there is always the possibility that soon IEW more powerful attacks might appear m the never ending data-hidmglattacker game.
VI. INTEGRITY CONTROL, TAMPER PROOFING AND

WATERMARK-ASSISTED COMMUNICATIONS
The goals of integrity control and tamper proofing consists in the verification of content integrity, in the detedion of local modiftations in images, video and documents, in the recovering of the original content based on the available copy of modified or tampered content The generalived blockdiagram of an integrity control and verification system is shown inFigure 6. Thii protocol is quite similar to the robust watermarking (Figure 1) and consists of three main parts. The first part, information embedding, has the same purpose as in robust watermarking, i.e. embedding of the payload b into the original data x with t k specified distortion that should not exceed Dl. However, a fundamental difference exists between these two applications that consists in the nature of the payload b. The payload b has a higher rate (about 5-1 0 Kbits depending on the size of the original data). Moreover, tlle payload b is content dependant and related to the original data by some mapping rule j i ( b l z ) th-u might represent some hashing, features or even compressed version of the original content. Therefore, depending on the final requirements it might be necessary to provide the embedding rate in the range of I t = 1 -2 bpp @its per pixels). and sclf-moveling systems.
Generalized diagram of integrity control, tamper proofing
The second element of the protocol is the public network represented by some channel with the transition matrix &ylg'). The behavior of this channel also shows significant differences with the corresponding robust watermarking chamel. Contrarily to the robust watermarking channel, where the attacker is interested in impairing the reliable watermark detectionldecoding subject to the constraint of the maximum allowable distortion De, the protocol attacker in this application h s completely different objectives. The main goal of the attacker is to modify or to counterfeit the content with the pnrpose of producing a new content with a modified visual appearance. For example, the content could be modifkd by replacing objects, objects featnres, human faces, bodies, different authentication attributes, background, or any identification data targeting some sensational, misleading or illegal purposes. obviously, in this case the document is either partially modified or a fraction of th document is copied into another document. Therefore, the global introduced distoltion D:! is of secon* importance for the evaluation of the degree of document m o d i h t i o n for &is application The following example demonstrates the possible cmtent modifications of two source images (Figures 7.a,b) ; such alterations could change the historical, artistic or evencriminalisticconclusions that couldbe drawl.
Figures 7c is the result of a collage between the two previous
images. The goal of the decoder of a tamper proofing system 'is thus to reliably detect the intentional or unintentional modifications (Figure 7 4 and to preferably rtxonstruct the original content.
Therefore, from the attacker perspective the integrity of the docunient should be preserved in such a "ay that the authentication watermark will not be capable to detect the To withstand the above attacks one should properly design a data-hiding scheme that should resolve two related problems: detection of modifications;
recovering of the original data x after content modifications.
According to the payload and the targeted objectives, the existing practical systems can be divided in three large groups: visual hashing; hybrid robust watermarking and tamper proofing; self-recovering watermarking.
A. Rohust visual hashing
The idea of robust visual hashing is to generate a keydependent secure digest which continuously changes with the input, differing at most by a small number of bits, for two distinct hut perceptually equivalent inputs. Robust hashing can be seen as a three-steps operation: first, feutitres atraction which resists to the transformations that we define as acceptable; secondly, a (generally key-dependent) randomization process on these features in order to achieve security; thirdly, a data reduction step which maps the randomized information to a shorter bit string representing the input data.
For the features extraction step from the visual input x, we have to define what is an "acceptable" alteration, and which inputs can be considered as "perceptually equivalent". This aspect concerns both the type and the level of The randomization step generally based on a key K is essential, since the generated code should keep the same properties as a classical cryptographic hash function beside their continuous character: codes should be unpredictable for random inputs, and two completely different inputs should result into uncorrelated codes. In the case of keyed hashing, two different keys (differing even by a single bit) should also produce totally different codes . Fridrich [42] uses keydependent random matrices to randomize low-pass DCT, and Venkatesan ef a1 [44] propose a random tiling of the wavelet transform (DWT) of the input prior to features extraction.
Finally the data reduction step is the irreversible data compression which reduces the length of the encoded features to a compact digest code. Both the randomization and the data reduction steps should preserve the continuous property of the input features, and for this purpose these two last steps could be done together rather than separately.
The verification is then done by counting the percentage of mismatching bits with a threshold representing the amount of allowed distortion.
B. Hybrid robust watermarking and tamper proofing
While robust watermarking for copyright protection was clearly the first main research direction of the 90th, authentication and tamper proofing watermarks have then been rapidly proposed for authentication and verification of integrity. Authentication aims at checking the authenticity of a document and of its source, while tamper proofing is used to detect unauthorized modifications. Fragile and semi-fragile watermarks aim at making falsifications and unauthorized modifications easy to detect and characterize.
While authenticationitamper proofing watermarks generally easily detect simple local alterations, many proposed fragile schemes based on block-wise independent hashing are vulnerable to substitution attacks which use images which are protected with the same key: parts are cut from these protected images, and pasted together to form a new imagethis is called the cut-and-paste attack. Generally the attacker needs to preserve some synchronization between the pasted parts in order to fool the tampering detector.
The VQ or Holliman-Memon attack [45l is a cut-andpaste attack which aims at constructing completely arbitray images which &e wrongly authenticated, composed with blocks (the Same blocks as those used by the tamper proofing watermark) taken from a database of images protected with the same key; this attack results in very good quality faked images. Various methods of neghboring blocks and hashcodes chaining can defeat the VQ attack. However in a collage attack larger parts are cut from the source images; in this case each pasted area is individually authenticatedby the detector, andonly the boundaries between them are detected.
This makes it difficult to figure out the actual authenticity of the copied regions with respect to each other in the context of the composed image, and a collage cannot be distingukhed with certainty from simple local tampering. Therefore tbe collage attack can be seen as a protocol attack resulting into an ambiguity about the partial authenticity of the image and the mhxe of theapplied attack. No classical tamper proofing watermarking scheme is able to solve this problem, except the one of Fridrich [46] which proposes to embed an additional unique ID (e.% time-stamps) within each image, or each hashed block.
Regarding robust watermarking, the copy attack is also a protocol attack creating the ambiguity by copying a watermark from a protected image to another one. This is a potential problem for many real-world applications: how to be sure that the document holds the real copyright message? While several approaches have been proposed to defeat this attack, one possibility is to include host data related information into the watermark in order to detect the copy attack. However we propose a more powerfd solution consisting of joining a robust watermark and a tamper proofing watermark in a hybrid approach. First, a hybrid scheme can solve copyright problems and check authenticity and integrity in an integrated approach Secondly, this is of great advantage for defeating the two protocol attacks mentioned above: the copy attack and the collage attack. The copy attack is made impossible since hash-codes immediately fail at the verification stage if the watermark was copied to another host. Regarding the collage athck, the robust part of the hybrid watermark belps us to determine if the image is made of different areas coming from different sources (holding different robust watermarks), and to distinguish between these nrens. Fridrich [46] proposed such a hybrid method, but she uses a watermark with relatkly low robusbess of the robust part, and the advantages of the hybrid concept against these two protocol attacks were not indicated.
Cur hybrid watermark scheme, described in more details by Deguillaume et aI [33] , works as follows: first, a highly robust watermark is integrated with a fragile or semi-fmgile block-wise watermark for combined copyright protection, tamper proofing and authenticatioh Secondly, the fragilelsemi-fragde part is embedded orthogonally with respect to the robust part in order to fully preserve it; this orthogonality is obtained by placing both watermarks at . , different positions (meaning different pixels). Thirdly, additional cqptogaphic countermeasures, such as hashcodes and blocks chainin& unique time-stamps, undeterministic hash-codes, .etc. are used in order to defeat substitution attacks. Fmlly, the information coming from both the robust and the fragilelsemi-fragile parts are combined and intelpreted in order to detect copy or collage attacks. This solution is integmted in a prototype Berkut 2.0 [32].
C. Self-recovering watermarking
Error resilient coding and error comalment have receiRd recently a lot of attention in different application related to wireless networks and networks with no QoS control.
The main existing techniques can be characterized as [47] : layered coding with transport coding, multiple description coding, joint source/channel coding, robust waveform coding, robust entropy coding and post-processing at the decoder. Data-hiding techniques could be used as well for this putpose. Moreover, intentional content modifications could be considered as t k channel degradation and appropriate strategies can be applied for the self-recovering data The main practical approaches to self-recovering watermarkmg differ depending on the used payload (features, edges, compressed coefficients), data-embedding technique and final recomtmctionlrecovering procedure. For instance, an example of edge directivity embeddmg is proposed by Generally, any sort of image features can be embedded into the image itself that shouldhelp reconstmct the resulting h a p a f t e r channel degradations. If the quadratic distortion is used as a fidelity measure and the channel distortions are interpreted as AWGN, and if the content is assumed to be stationary Gaussian, one can apply the MMSE estimator to reconstmct the original image (as post-processing). Tk resulting variance of the obtained estimate ,,T:~,,!,~~ depends on tbe variance of the content and,+ v a r m e of the channel noise 2, as: c+f,,,,?,; = *. Therefore, the higher the variance of the image, the i' owir is the accuracy of the estimate. A maximum likelihood (MI,) estimate is most often applied to real images to estimate the local image variance. It is a known fact that real images are h i h l y non-stationary processes. The variance in the vicinity of the edges and textures will thus be highly overestimated
[50], v!~.,~,~,: will h n be very large in these regions and no rrliable estimate will be possible. Therrfore, one can embed additional information about edges and textures in the watermark to reduce the variance of the estimation, while flat regions that are characterized by relatively low variance can easily be reconstructed at the decoder. This approach to error-resilient coding can be efficiently used for the SoQ control and enhanced scalability of public networks. cc:
D. Joint s o d c h a n n e l coding with side irtfonnnlion
AI1 the above schemes can be considered in a generalized setup of joint sourcdchnnnel coding with side information. Si= we have already considered channel coding with si& informaiion at the encoder in Sedion V, we will focus in this section on source coding with side information at the decoder.
We start by considering the problem of lossy compression with side information (Figme 8). This problem was funt introduced by Wyner- Ziv (1976) [51] with X and Y being continuous correlated i.i.d. sources with joint p.d.f. ~,.y,'<+~j. The problem is to compress X in a 1 0 5~ way with Y being known at the decoder but not at the encoder. :(0:4) . The encoder and the decoder communicate without error at a rate .I2 bits per source symbol. .4t the same time, the decoder has access to Y = X --2 (Figure 9) . Generalizd diagnin of lorsy source coding with nidc [52] Having conshered the main sesuhs of source and cham net coding with side information, we can design a joint sourcehhannel coding (JSCC) system that generalizes the above approaches. The block diagam of JSCC system with side information is shown in Figure 10 . For simplicity, assume that the chumel is characterized either bv AWGN or by some high-rate lossy compression that degrade the image quality. The allowable channel distortion is D: while the degradation due to the watermark embedding should not exceedD1. Theratio D,/D:! determines the maximum datahiding rate according to the Gel'fand-Pinsker (S), Costa (9) , and (IO) channel coding setups. The source coding in the above JSCC scheme is designed assuming the Wyner-Ziv formulation, that is availability of the degraded stego data y as the side information at the decoder. The watermark (payload) represents the direct compressed channel transmission in the Wyner-Ziv problem communicated with the rate R 2 II(~i-ll-:). The simplest I-D interpretation of the above scheme is shown in Figure 11 . The c h e l code is represented by a uniform scalar quantizer that at the Same time corresponds to a "coarse" approximation of the source data x. The source code is designed based on a lattice code with respect to the above scalar quantizer, assuming amplitude limited attacks or distortions. In particular, 4-PAM is used within each bin of lattice code providing a total embedding rate of 2 bits per pixel. It is also assumed that the watermark is encoded according to the Wyner-Ziv problem, modulated using multilevel codes and properly allocated owr the h a g s
The decoder extracts the watermark based on the Gel'fand-Pinsker decoding. Then the Wyner-Ziv decoder performs the reconstluction of the original data x using the estimated payload 6 and the side information y. In the noisefree case, the quality of the reconstructed image will be determined by the specified distortion D of the lossy Wyner-Ziv coding. In the case of AWGN, the ratio of half of the distance between lattice constellations (&/2) in the source code to the noise standard deviation (&) will determine the correspondingprobability of decodingerror. If tior2 >> <, one can expect error-free communications typical for the QIM-like schemes andcorrespondingreconstmction withthe distortion not exceeding D. Otherwise, errors might occur and the system fails to reconstruct the original data with the given fidelity
The above JSCC scheme can also be used as a selfrecoveringkystem for networks with bit, block or packet losses or erasures. In these case, the payload should be decreased to enable appropriate encoding uskg error correction codes suited to the erasure channels, or simply using appropriate dataallocation with repetitions. This sort of communications represents a form of error resilient coding that can assist the problem of QoS control in public networks.
It should also be mentioned the possibility of hybrid analogldigital transmission where the digital counterpart (embedded watermark) can be used to provide additional quality of transmission for the authorized users [56] .
An extegsion to the abow JSCC is possible in the case of data deliwy wifh a given targeted data quality to different users, thai are divided on public users (those who do not know the key) and private users (those who have access to the key). Increasing the embedding distortion D 1, one can considerably degrade the image/video/audio quality thus making it uninteresting to public users, while private users can still decode the encoded data 'hrefore, this scheme can also be used in applications that require "partial data enclyption" to enable the secme content delivery to the target users.
VII. SECURE COMMUNICATIONS
The goal of secure communications is to securely deliw some content over the public networks. There are several possibilities for secure communications. The first one is a visual "encryption" or scrambling that should provide additional error resilience in the case of wireless networks and networks with packet losses and erasures. The second possibility is steganography that guarantees secure content delivery by hiding the content to be securely communicated into the covert media, whereas the presence of t h hidden content presence should not be detected by various detection tools.
A. virual scrambling
The goal of visual scrambling consists in the enciphering of visual content in a way suitable for reliable communications owr public networks; this prevents access of a thud unauthorized p d y to the enciphered content. The block diagram of visual scrambling is shown in Figure 12 . The content that should be securely communicated over public networks is scrambled at the encoder based on the private key in such a way that it cannot be anymore visually recogniEd. Contrarily to traditional data enciphering, it is required here to ensure both the visual scrambling and the error resilient coding. Moreowr, to provide a secure solution it is required to avoid additional redundancy in headers, meta data and attachments. It is also preferable to provide format independency and to ensure high efficiency towards erasure channels and channels with varying parameters. Obviously, traditional means cannot completely satisfy these requirements. T~K network part of communications is concerned in this application with two different issues, i.e., security and robustness. The security assumes that unauthorized deciphering can be applied and the robustness issue refers ta . different imperfections of networks explained in Section II.
Finally, the decoder should provide reliable descrambling of the content even if some bits, blocks or packets have been comupted during transmission. One of possible solutions of this problem was proposed by Grytskiv ci tcl 1571, based on phase enclyption. This approach, while being very simple, demonstrates high efficiency for both content scrambling and error resilience.
E. Sfeganography
: . > . . Steganography, originally designed for cover or hidden communications, should provide a certain level of security for public communications. The block diagram of steganographic communications is shown in Figure 13 . The encodingldecoding part of steganography systems has a lot in However, it has [reduced requirements towards attacks aiming at the watermark removal and thus it can provide higher embedding late. It essentially coiresponds to high WNRregime of data hiding meaning that nomially it should withstand .unintentional attacks such as format conversion, slight lossy compression and in some special cases analog to digital conversion. While most existing steganographic tools can provide perceptually invisible data hiding, the stochastic visibility or unauthorized detectability of hidden data still remains a challenging task. Therefore, to be secure. the steganographic system should satisfy a set of requirements. The main requirement consists in providing the statistical indistinguishability behveen the cover data and the host data. A possible informatioo-theoretic measure of stochastic closeness is the relative entropy or Kullback-Leiber distance (KLD) between two distributions under test, which was first proposed by Cacliin [ S I . More generally. the stochastic visibility can be considered as the possibility ofunauthorized detection to diffei-entiate behveen the covei-and the host data based on a hypothesis testing.
We review here the main countermeasures that can be used to deci-ease the stochastic visibility of a watermark. The main idea of these countermeasures consists in the preservation of the statistical properties of the cover data. i.e., in the design of a data hiding technology with minimum possible stochastic distortions: The main countermeasui-es are:
to reduce the amount of modifications in the cover data, i.e., embedding. This will decrease the embedding rate;
to reduce the amount of modifications by applying some eiror cor-rection codes with the error col-rection possibility Corresponding tu the amuunt of unchanged inappropriate data;
to reduce the amount of distortions by applying data hiding in some transform domain where the amount of zero and non-zero coefficients might not be equiprobable due to decorrelation and energy compaction properties of the applied transform. Use the ECCs that produce the resulting codewords with corresponding statistics; to apply encoding that uses the prior information about the host data as a side infoimation at encoder: to apply a traiisfonn that corrects the statistics of stego data but preserves capacity [for example pixserve relative entropy or p.d.f. or bit-plane relationships); to use content-based embedding assuming a 11011stationary Gaussian model of cover data. i.s., the model with locally smoothly changing variance. This will provide the possibility to embed more data in the textured areas which both perceptually and stochastically are less predictable_ and better preserve original content and hide modifications;
to choose the cover image from the set of images that provides the highest level of stochastic invisibility for a given message: synthesize a composite cover data for the same purpose.
The basic scheme for steganography communications requires higli-rate communications. Thus, the host interference cancellation issue should be resolved. The first steganographic techniques have been mostly built based on the LSBM embedding. The QIM and SCS based embedding for steganographic purposes. proposed by Eggers et a1 [S9] and Guillon et 01 [60] , have pl-oven that the SCS-based steganography is secure accoi-ding to the Cachin's criteria of +security [Si] However. the relative entropy is a global criteria and does not reflect the local content modifications. This means that the content can be inodified locally in such a way that the attacker can detect it either visually or using some specially designed statistical tests,. while the relative entropy can be tuned to be veiy low. This also valid for the estimation of image quality using the MSE cr-iterioii. It \vas alsu shown !hat images can be considerably locally distorted d i i l e the MSE indicated acceptable image quality [61] .
At tlie same time, it is obvious that the higher the darJ embedding rate, the more modifications we introduced into the original content and consequently the easier the task of steganalysis. The trade-off between data-hiding capacity and security o f data hiding technologies expressed as the possibility of unauthorized detection was performed by Voloshynovskiy and Pun [62] . Different data hiding techniques have been considered for both IowWNR and high-WNR regimes and coirespondins statistical detection strategies have been proposed. It was emphasized that the crucial role in the unauthorized detection of hidden data belongs to the proper stochastic modeling of the cuvrr content. The commonly used EQ model provides overestimated valws of local image v a r k s indicating 'Aigh stegnographic security of specific image regions". Therefore, the corresponding conclusion is thal one should embed the payload in edges a n textures due to their high variance and colresponding high probability of error of unauthorized detection Recent results obtained for capacity of robust data hiding techniques qwstion the validity of these assumptions [26] . It is also likely that the a p p e a r m of new more powerful and accurate stochastic image models cm change this belief and inspire new secure data hiding strategies.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The goal of this paper was to demonstrate how network security, QoS control and secure communications over the public networks can benefit from data hiding technologies. It was shown that such technologies can play an important assisting role in public networks characterized to be heterogeneous, time-varying and in networks with no QoS control. We have also indicated that traditional means of multimedia security can hardly cope with novel emerging requirements of multimedia communications. The data-hiding technologies, being a possible alternative, do not require considerable invesbnent, protocol modifications and are compatible with the existing standards of multimedia compression and communications. We have also developed a unified theoretical basis of digital datahiding as well as shown its major applications.' In particular, digital communication with side information was demonstrated to be an appropriate theoretical basis for considering different aspects of c h l coding and source coding in data-hiding applications. The recent interest towards the Gel'fand-Pinsker and Wyner-Ziv problems makes it possible to consider digital datahiding in the scope of multi-terminal and multi-user networks and communications. This makes the analysis even more attractiw with a huge future potential of extensions towards multimodal dah storage, communications and management in highly distributed environments. State-of-theart robust watermarking, tamper proofmg, watermark-assisted multimedia processingand secure communications are considered among others based on a unified theoretical basis. The main requirements, desigp principles, generalizations, as well as future perspectives are mderlined in the paper.
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